Kill malicious referendum #334 via Whitelisted Caller

18hrs 29mins ago
0

This proposal terminates Bifrost Polkadot referendum #334 using referenda.kill(334) and slashes its submission and decision deposits, totaling 50,010 BNC.

Background and rationale

At finalized block 14,654,085 on 13 November 2026, 05:35:00 UTC, referendum #334 was ongoing on the Root track, with no confirmation period in progress. Its referenced preimage was absent from on-chain storage:

  • Proposal hash: 0xa6580b186e29e65ef7cf1f01e3dbfa669a05e024add46d9e8d26d755f600977c
  • Declared preimage length: 1,658 bytes
  • Submission and decision deposit payer: 12anuSXEhT3KG2D44HCMXG2pjMpQb2Wm7EdcWhrDjWK9BCfg
  • That account was not a member of the on-chain Bifrost Fellowship at the snapshot block.

The governance monitor flagged this referendum as malicious under its rule for non-Fellowship submissions with a missing preimage. The missing preimage prevents public inspection of the proposed Root action; it does not establish a specific exploit or transfer. Non-membership alone is not evidence of malicious intent. This proposal seeks to close the flagged referendum and penalize its deposit payer rather than leave an unauditable Root proposal active.

Proposed action

whitelist.dispatchWhitelistedCallWithPreimage(
  referenda.kill(334)
)

The Fellowship must whitelist the hash of the inner referenda.kill(334) call. The Whitelisted Caller referendum executes the outer wrapper, which dispatches the approved inner call as Root. This follows the official Whitelisted Caller construction.

The action kills only referendum #334 and slashes its 10 BNC submission deposit and 50,000 BNC decision deposit. It does not slash voting principal or add a voting lock. This proposal requests no Treasury funding.

calldata: 0x25044e010000

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